Department of Industrial Engineering & Decision Analysis [IEDA Seminar] - Optimal No-Regret Learning in Repeated First-Price Auctions
First-price auctions have very recently swept the online advertising industry, replacing second-price auctions as the predominant auction mechanism on many platforms for display ads bidding. This shift has brought forth important challenges for a bidder: how should one bid in a first-price auction, where unlike in second-price auctions, it is no longer optimal to bid one's private value truthfully and hard to know the others' bidding behaviors? In this paper, we take an online learning angle and address the fundamental problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions. We discuss our recent work in leveraging the special structures of the first-price auctions to design minimax optimal no-regret bidding algorithms.
Zhengyuan Zhou is currently an assistant professor in New York University Stern School of Business, Department of Technology, Operations and Statistics. Before joining NYU Stern, Professor Zhou spent the year 2019-2020 as a Goldstine research fellow at IBM research. He received his BA in Mathematics and BS in Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, both from UC Berkeley, and subsequently a PhD in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University in 2019. His research interests lie at the intersection of machine learning, stochastic optimization and game theory and focus on leveraging tools from those fields to develop methodological frameworks to solve data-driven decision-making problems.