FINTECH THRUST SEMINAR | Undominated Mechanisms
Undominated Mechanisms
Abstract:
We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if no other feasible mechanism dominates it. We show how analyzing undominated mechanisms could be useful and illustrate the tractability of characterizing such mechanisms. This approach provides an alternative criterion for mechanism design under non-Bayesian uncertainty, complementing existing methods.
Jiangtao Li is an Associate Professor at the School of Economics, Singapore Management University, with a focus on economic theory and mechanism design. His research has been published in top journals, including Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior. He also serves as an Associate Editor for the Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, and the International Journal of Economic Theory.